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Abstract
In this paper we study the effect of network structure between agents and objects on
measures for systemic risk. We model the influence of sharing large exogeneous losses to
the financial or (re)insuance market by a bipartite graph. Using Pareto-tailed losses and
multivariate regular variation we obtain asymptotic results for systemic conditional risk
measures based on the Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Tail Expectation. These results
allow us to assess the influence of an individual institution on the systemic or market risk
and vice versa through a collection of conditional systemic risk measures. For large markets
Poisson approximations of the relevant constants are provided in the example of an insurance
market. The example of an underlying homogeneous random graph is analysed in detail, and
the results are illustrated through simulations.
MSC2010 Subject Classifications: primary: 90B15 secondary: 91B30, 60G70, 62P05, 62E20
Keywords: Bipartite network, multivariate regular variation, Value-at-Risk, Conditional Tail
Expectation, Expected Shortfall, systemic risk measures, conditional risk measures, Poisson
approximation.
1 Introduction
Quantitative assessments of financial risk and of (re)insurance risk has to take the interwoven web
of agents and business relationships into account in order to capture systemic risk phenomena.
Measuring such risks while accounting for this complex system of agents is an ongoing area
of research, see for example [2, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16]. This paper joins the discussion by adapting
conditional systemic risk measures which are based on similar asymptotic arguments as classical
risk measures. Making use of results derived in [15], we illustrate these risk measures on a
bipartite graph model for the agent-object market structure, combined with a heavy-tailed loss
distribution.
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The conditional systemic risk measures in this paper are conditional versions of the Value-
at-Risk (VaR) defined for a random variable X at confidence level 1− γ as
VaR1−γ(X) := inf{t ≥ 0 : P (X > t) ≤ γ}, γ ∈ (0, 1),
and the Conditional Tail Expectation (CoTE), also known as Expected Shortfall, at confidence
level 1− γ, based on the corresponding VaR, as
CoTE1−γ(X) := E[X | X > VaR1−γ(X)], γ ∈ (0, 1). (1.1)
For a systemic risk approach it is of interest to quantify not only the risk of single agents,
but also the market risk, which is of high relevance to regulators. Moreover, it is natural to
investigate an agent’s risk based on the aggregated market risk; see e.g. Theorem 2.4 of [20].
Consequently, we will study conditional systemic risk measures where the conditioning event
involves the whole market risk as well as its influence on one specific agent. In the same way,
it is of interest to evaluate the market risk conditioned on the event that one agent faces high
losses. Such ideas lead to a classification of conditional systemic risk measures as in Table 1.1
(motivated by [9]) which will be defined in Definition 1.1. Note that the definition of CoVaR
is already present in [1] and the ICoTE goes back to the so-called Marginal expected Shortfall
from [7].
marginal risk measure institution | institution institution | system system | institution
VaR MCoVaR ICoVaR SCoVaR
CoTE MCoTE ICoTE SCoTE
Table 1.1: Classifying conditional systemic risk measures: “M” stands for mutual indicating the risk
measure of one institution given high risk in another institution; “I” stands for individual indicating the
risk of an individual institution given high market risk; and “S” stands for system indicating the risk of
the system given high risk of an institution.
In [8], [10] and [16] an axiomatic framework for systemic risk has been suggested. This
general framework assumes that a conditional systemic risk measure ρ of a multivariate risk
X = (X1, . . . , Xn) can be represented as the composition of a univariate (single-agent) risk
measure ρ0 with an aggregation function Λ : Rn → Rn, so that ρ = ρ0 ◦ Λ. Here, ρ0 is usually
assumed to be convex as well as monotone and positively 1-homogeneous. While the conditions
on Λ vary, there is consensus that Λ should be positively 1-homogeneous, so that Λ(ax) = aΛ(x)
for a > 0. We deviate from [8] in that we do not assume that Λ((1, . . . , 1)>) = n. Examples for
such aggregation functions are Λ(x) = ‖x‖ = (∑ni=1 |xi|r) 1r , which is a norm for r ≥ 1 and a
quasi-norm for 0 < r < 1, and Λ(x) = xi, the projection onto one coordinate. The fact that we
do not require Λ((1, . . . , 1)>) = n has consequences in terms of system size: Assuming that ρ0
is monotone, the inequalities n < ‖(1, . . . , 1)‖r for 0 < r < 1 as well as n > ‖(1, . . . , 1)‖r for
1 < r ≤ ∞ hold. Therefore, systemic risk may increase faster or increase slower, respectively,
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as the number number of individual risks grows compared to systemic risk with respect to a
normalized aggregation function. Such effects can be realistic as a larger market may not be
proportionally risky to a smaller market due to a balance of risk as is well-known for insurance
portfolios. In addition, we argue that in a small and risky market the regulator may well strive
for more risk capital than the sum of risks. Also moral hazard from the different institutions is
well-known and the regulator may guard against this hazard by choosing a conditional systemic
risk measure which is larger than the sum of the individual risks in the market as a quasi-norm
would imply. Whatever type of aggregation function is chosen, in practice this is an economical
decision. Our framework provides considerable variability in the choice of aggregation function.
In this paper we relate market risk to individual risk in the mathematical framework of
multivariate regular variation. This framework allows us to assess conditional systemic risk
measures as in Table 1.1 asymptotically in a precise way.
Definition 1.1. [Conditional systemic risk measures] Let F = (F1, . . . , Fq) be the random
exposure vector and let ‖ · ‖ be a norm or a quasinorm. For γi, γ ∈ (0, 1) referring to agent i
and the market, respectively, the conditional systemic risk measures from Table 1.1 are defined
as follows:
(a) Individual Conditional Value-at-Risk
ICoVaR1−γi,γ(Fi | h(F )) := inf{t ≥ 0 : P (Fi > t | h(F ) > VaR1−γ(h(F ))) ≤ γi},
(b) Systemic Conditional Value-at-Risk
SCoVaR1−γ,γi(h(F ) | Fi) := inf{t ≥ 0 : P (h(F ) > t | Fi > VaR1−γ(Fi)) ≤ γ},
(c) Mutual Conditional Value-at-Risk
MCoVaR1−γi,γk(Fi | Fk) := inf{t ≥ 0 : P (Fi > t | Fk > VaR1−γk(Fk)) ≤ γi},
(d) Individual Conditional Tail Expectation
ICoTE1−γ(Fi | h(F )) := E[Fi | h(F ) > VaR1−γ(h(F ))],
(e) Systemic Conditional Tail Expectation
SCoTE1−γ(h(F ) | Fi) := E[h(F ) | Fi > VaR1−γ(Fi)],
(f) Mutual Conditional Tail Expectation
MCoTE1−γ(Fi | Fk) := E[Fi | Fk > VaR1−γ(Fk)].
For the risk measures (d)-(f) finite first moments of the underlying random variables are required.

To model the complex interaction between economic agents and objects we use a bipartite
network, see Figure 1 for a depiction. The network can be summarised through a random q × d
weighted adjacency matrix A given by
Aij = Wij1(i ∼ j), where 0
0
:= 0, (1.2)
where Wij are positive weights which may depend on the underlying network. The objects can
generate large losses as portfolios in a hedge fund, for instance, or as catastrophic claims in
(re)insurance. In Section 5 we shall see that the network is of considerable importance for the
asymptotic behaviour of the conditional systemic risk measures.
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the bipartite graph model in
detail and present the motivating examples. Section 3 summarizes the necessary results from
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Figure 1: The hierarchical structure of the market as a bipartite graph.
regular variation. Here we also present the asymptotic results of conditional probabilities and
conditional expectations. While we formulate our results in the general context of regular varia-
tion with arbitrary dependence structure, we single out the two cases, asymptotic independence
and asymptotic complete dependence, of the loss variables. In Section 4 we discuss the asymptotic
behaviour of the conditional systemic risk measures in our network model. When introducing
conditional systemic risk measures, for the individual risk of every agent in the market we focus
on the one-dimensional projections of the exposure vector, and take norms and quasi-norms as
appropriate aggregation functions.
Finally, in Section 5 we also discuss the consequence of the fact that not all claims may
be insured or not all assets may find investors, respectively. We furthermore present the ho-
mogeneous model, which exactly has this feature. Calculating the network-dependent quantities
which determine the asymptotic behaviour of the conditional systemic risk measures is not always
straightforward; hence we provide a Poisson approximation for some standard specifications of
the model, with bounds on the total variation distance. Simulations for the homogeneous model
illustrate the results.
2 The bipartite graph model
Throughout we assume that the objects, which are large claims or losses, have a random amount
modelled by random variables Vj for j = 1, . . . , d with Pareto-tails such that, for possibly
different Kj > 0 and tail index α > 0,
P (Vj > t) ∼ Kjt−α, t→∞. (2.1)
(For two functions f and g we write f(t) ∼ g(t) as t→∞ if limt→∞ f(t)/g(t) = 1.) We summa-
rize all objects in the vector V = (V1, . . . , Vd)
> and assume that V is independent of the random
graph construction, while V1, . . . , Vd may not be independent of each other.
Each agent may cover a random amount or proportion of an object, modelled by a random
weight matrix W : Ω → Rq×d+ , which satisfies the integrability condition E[‖W‖α+δ] < ∞ for
some matrix norm ‖·‖ and some δ > 0. We assume that Wij > 0 for all (i, j) such that i ∼ j. The
random variable 1(i ∼ j) equals 1 whenever agent i holds a contractual relationships to object j,
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and 0 otherwise. The proportion of object j which affects agent i is represented by Wij1(i ∼ j).
Then Fi :=
∑d
j=1Wij1(i ∼ j) denotes the exposure of agent i and F = (F1, . . . , Fq)> is the
vector of the joint exposures of the agents in the market. Hence, the weighted adjacency matrix
A : Ω→ Rq×d representing the market structure is given by
Aij = Wij1(i ∼ j), where 0
0
:= 0. (2.2)
Consequently, the vector F of agent exposures is the matrix-vector product
F = AV. (2.3)
Example 2.1. [Large reinsurance risks, [15]] In this example, agents are reinsurance companies
and objects are large claims. Under the simplified assumption that claims are split into equal
proportions among all agents which insure this risk, the market matrix A is
Aij =
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
, (2.4)
where deg(j) denotes the number of agents that insure object j. 
Example 2.2. [Coupled portfolios of highly risky assets, [12]] In this example, agents are in-
vestors and objects are investment opportunities. Each agent i has a certain amount of capital
to invest, say Ci > 0. Again for simplicity, we assume that he splits his money in equal portions
to all the assets he has chosen to invest in. This results in a market matrix A given by
Aij = Ci
1(i ∼ j)
deg(i)
(2.5)
where deg(i) denotes the number of different assets agent i invests in. 
We consider risk measures of F = AV , where the random matrix A models the network
structure of the market. Instead of attributing a risk measure to an agent’s exposure or to the
market exposure, we write for short an agent’s risk or the market risk.
In [15] it was shown that under the assumption of regularly varying exposure vectors the
asymptotic behaviour of the VaR and the CoTE can be described using the constants
Ciind = C
i
ind(A) :=
d∑
j=1
KjEAαij , i = 1, . . . , q, and CSind = CSind(A) =
d∑
j=1
KjE‖Aej‖α, (2.6)
as well as
Cidep = C
i
dep(A) := E(AK1/α1)αi , i = 1, . . . , q, and CSdep = CSdep(A) = E‖AK1/α1‖α, (2.7)
where 1 is the d−dimensional vector with entries all equal 1 and K1/α = diag(K1/α1 , . . . ,K1/αd )
is a d× d diagonal matrix. Here the subscripts ind and dep refer to asymptotically independent
or asymptotically fully dependent components of the Vj ’s, respectively.
Lemma 2.3 (Corollaries 3.6 and 3.7 of [15]). Let α > 0 and F = (F1, . . . , Fq)
> the vector of
the agents’ exposures.
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(a) The individual Value–at–Risk of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , q} shows the asymptotic behaviour
VaR1−γ(Fi) ∼ C1/αγ−1/α, γ → 0, (2.8)
with either C = Ciind or C = C
i
dep in case V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent or
asymptotically fully dependent. The market Value–at–Risk of the aggregated vector ‖F‖
satisfies
VaR1−γ(‖F‖) ∼ C1/αγ−1/α, γ → 0, (2.9)
with either C = CSind or C = C
S
dep in case V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent or
asymptotically fully dependent.
(b) Let α > 1. The individual Conditional Tail Expectation of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} shows the
asymptotic behaviour
CoTE1−γ(Fi) ∼ α
α− 1VaR1−γ(Fi) ∼
α
α− 1C
1/αγ−1/α , γ → 0,
with either C = CSind or C = C
S
dep in case V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent or
asymptotically fully dependent. The market Conditional Tail Expectation of the aggregated
vector ‖F‖ satisfies
CoTE1−γ(‖F‖) ∼ α
α− 1VaR1−γ(‖F‖) ∼
α
α− 1C
1/αγ−1/α , γ → 0,
with either C = CSind or C = C
S
dep in case V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent or
asymptotically fully dependent.
For the asymptotic behaviour of the Value-at-Risk and of the Conditional Tail Expectation
the underlying network model enters only through the constants (2.6) and (2.7). Many underlying
networks, even networks for which the adjacency matrix is deterministic, may hence give rise to
the same asymptotic behaviour.
When the Pareto-tailed losses are independent, the constant (2.6) with superscript i indicates
the individual setting of agent i, whereas S refers to the systemic setting. We contrast this
with the fully dependent case; the corresponding quantities are given in (2.7). In general, small
constants are more desirable, indicating a smaller risk. The case of fully dependent objects is
equivalent to having a single source of risk, but with the loss to be unevenly distributed among
the agents.
As indicated in [15] these two extreme dependence cases give rise to risk bounds (cf. [14]),
which are determined using the constants given in (2.6) and (2.7).
3 Asymptotic results from multivariate regular variation
To obtain asymptotic results as in Lemma 2.3 for the conditional systemic risk measures from
Definition 1.1 in a more general framework, we first extend classical results for regular variation
to continuous 1-homogeneous functions. Examples for such continuous 1-homogeneous functions
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are projections of the vector F = (F1, . . . , Fq)
> on the i-th coordinate Fi, and the norm or
quasi-norm of the vector F , which link up with Section 2.
Our framework will be regular variation of the random vector of exposures F , which follows
from the Pareto-tailed claims and the dependence structure introduced by the bipartite graph;
cf. [15]. There are several equivalent definitions of multivariate regular variation; cf. Theorem 6.1
of [18] and Ch. 2.1 of [4]. Also notions like one point uncompactification and vague convergence
are defined there, referring to [18], Section 6.1.3, for more background.
For d ∈ N, let Sd−1+ = {x ∈ Rd+ : ‖x‖ = 1} denote the positive unit sphere in Rd with respect
to an arbitrary norm ‖ · ‖ on Rd so that ‖ej‖ = 1 for all unit vectors ej . Furthermore, we shall
use the notation E := Rd+ \ {0} with R+ = [0,∞], 0 is the d−dimensional vector with entries all
equal to 0, and B = B(E) denotes the Borel σ-algebra with respect to the so-called one point
uncompactification.
Definition 3.1. A random vector X with state space E is called multivariate regularly varying
if there is a Radon measure µ 6≡ 0 on B(E) with µ(Rd+ \ Rd+) = 0 and
P(X ∈ t·)
P(‖X‖ > t)
v→ µ(·), t→∞, (3.1)
where
v→ denotes vague convergence. In this case there exists some α > 0 such that the limit
measure is homogeneous of order −α:
µ(uS) = u−αµ(S), u > 0,
for every S ∈ B(E) satisfying µ(∂S) = 0. The measure µ is called intensity measure of X.
The tail index α > 0 is also called the index of regular variation of X, and we write X ∈ R(−α).

Regular variation of V implies regular variation of F under a Breiman condition on the
weight matrix W from (2.2). We shall use the following result, which is based on Proposition
A.1 in [5].
Proposition 3.2. Let V := (V1, . . . , Vd)
> be multivariate regularly varying having components
with Pareto-tails P(Vj > t) ∼ Kjt−α as t→∞ for Kj , α > 0 as in (2.1) with intensity measure
µ as in (3.1). Furthermore, let the weight matrix W : Ω → Rq×d+ satisfy E[‖W‖α+δ] < ∞
for some δ > 0. Then the random vector F = AV with A as in (2.2) belongs to R(−α). Let
h : Rq \ {0} → Rk \ {0} for k ∈ N be a continuous 1-homogeneous function. Then we have on
B(h(Rq+ \ {0})):
P (h(F ) ∈ t·)
P (‖V ‖ > t)
v→ Eµ{x ∈ Rd+ : h(Ax) ∈ ·}, t→∞. (3.2)
Proof. Vague convergence of F is given by Proposition A.1 in [5] and is equivalent to
P (F ∈ tB)
P (‖V ‖ > t) → Eµ{x ∈ R
d
+ : Ax ∈ B}, t→∞, (3.3)
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for all relatively compact sets B ∈ B(Rq+ \ {0}) with Eµ ◦ A−1(∂B) = 0. Furthermore, by 1-
homogeneity of h, for t > 0, {h(F ) ∈ tB} = {F ∈ th−1(B)}. Note also that every B, which is
bounded away from zero, is relatively compact in the topology we use. Since h−1(B) is bounded
away from zero by continuity of h and the fact that h(0) = 0, h−1(B) is also relatively compact.
Moreover, Eµ ◦A−1(∂h−1(B)) ≤ Eµ ◦A−1 ◦ h−1(∂B).
Putting all this together, for every relatively compact set B ∈ B(h(Rq+ \ {0})) with Eµ ◦ A−1 ◦
h−1(∂B) = 0 we have, as t→∞,
P (h(F ) ∈ tB)
P (‖V ‖ > t) =
P
(
F ∈ th−1(B))
P (‖V ‖ > t) → Eµ{x ∈ R
d
+ : Ax ∈ h−1(B)} = Eµ{x ∈ Rd+ : h(Ax) ∈ (B)}.
This is equivalent to vague convergence in (3.2).
For the extreme dependence case corresponding to vectors V with asymptotically indepen-
dent components the reference measure µ has support on the axes; in the extreme dependence
case corresponding to vectors V with asymptotically fully dependent components the reference
measure µ has support on the line {sK1/α1 : s > 0}. This difference in support is reflected in
the difference between (2.6) and (2.7) and affects the behaviour of aggregated exposures.
Proposition 3.3. Assume the situation of Proposition 3.2. For the aggregated exposures h(F )
we obtain
P(h(F ) > t) ∼ Cht−α, t→∞,
with
Ch = Chind =
d∑
j=1
KjEhα(Aej) and Ch = Chdep(h) = Ehα(AK1/α1) (3.4)
if V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent, respectively.
Proof. The assertion can be shown in an analogous way to Theorem 3.4 of [15].
The following result gives limit relations in the most general situation, without any restriction
on the dependence in the exposure vector.
Theorem 3.4. Let g, h : Rq+ → R+ be continuous 1−homogeneous functions and assume the
situation of Proposition 3.2. Then for u ∈ (0,∞), the following assertions hold:
(a) lim
t→∞P (g(F ) > t | h(F ) > ut) = u
αEµ ◦A−1({x ∈ Rq+ : h(x) > u, g(x) > 1})
Eµ ◦A−1({x ∈ Rq+ : h(x) > 1})
.
(b) If g is additionally bounded or has compact support on Rd+ \ {0}, then
lim
t→∞E[g(F ) | h(F ) > t] ∼
t
µ˜({h(x) > 1})
∫
h(x)>1
g(x)µ˜(dx), (3.5)
where µ˜(·) = Eµ ◦A−1(·).
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Proof. (a) We use Proposition 3.2 to obtain
P (g(F ) > t | h(F ) > ut) =
∫
h(F )>ut
g(F )>t
dP
P (h(F ) > ut)
=
∫
h(x)>u
g(x)>1
P (F ∈ tdx)
P (‖V ‖ > t)
P (‖V ‖ > t)
P (h(F ) > ut)
.
The second ratio converges by Proposition 3.2(a) and also the first, when taking there for h the
identity function. The result follows then by vague convergence.
(b) Using 1-homogeneity of g and Proposition 3.2,
E[g(F ) | h(F ) > t] = 1
P(h(F ) > t)
∫
h(x)>t
g(x)P(F ∈ dx)
=
1
P(h(F ) > t)
∫
h(x)>1
g(tx)P(F ∈ tdx)
=
P(‖V ‖ > t)
P(h(F ) > t)
∫
h(x)>1
g(tx)
P(F ∈ tdx)
P(‖V ‖ > t)
∼ t
µ˜({h(x) > 1})
∫
h(x)>1
g(x)µ˜(dx). (3.6)
Recall that the sequence of bounded measures in (3.2) converges to a bounded measure vaguely
if and only if it converges weakly to this measure, see Theorem 2.1.4 in [4] for further details.
Hence, either assumptions on g in (b) is sufficient to achieve convergence for (3.6).
Corollary 3.5. Let u ∈ (0,∞) and assume the situation of Proposition 3.2. Recall the constants
Chind and C
h
dep from (3.4).
(a) If V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent, then
lim
t→∞P (g(F ) > t | h(F ) > ut) = (C
h
ind)
−1
d∑
j=1
Emin{hα(AK1/αej), uαgα(AK1/αej)}. (3.7)
(b) If V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically fully dependent, then
lim
t→∞P (g(F ) > t | h(F ) > ut) = (C
h
dep)
−1Emin{hα(AK1/α1), uαgα(AK1/α1)} (3.8)
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4 of [15]. For asymptotically independent
claims V1, . . . , Vd we obtain by Theorem 3.4(a) for the numerator
Eµ ◦A−1({h(x) > u, g(x) > 1}) = (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1
d∑
j=1
KjEmin{u−αhα(Aej), gα(Aej)},
and the expression in the denominator is
(
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1
d∑
j=1
KjE{u−αhα(Aej)} = (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1Chind, (3.9)
which yields (3.7). In the case of asymptotically fully dependent claims we get by Theo-
rem 3.4(b),
Eµ ◦A−1({h(x) > u, g(x) > 1}) = ‖K1/α1‖−αEmin{u−αhα(AK1/α1), gα(AK1/α1)},
giving with corresponding nominator relation (3.8).
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Remark 3.6. In extreme value theory the tail dependence coefficient is usually defined for
two possibly dependent random variables X1, X2 with the same marginal distribution function
as limx→∞ P(X2 > x | X1 > x) provided that this limit exists (e.g. Section 9.5 in [6]). The
resulting number is interpreted as a measure describing coinciding large losses. The conditional
probabilities in Definition 1.1 (a)-(c) are defined via such conditional probabilities, allowing
for asymmetry. As a consequence of regular variation the limits of the following conditional
probabilities as well as the conditional expectations can be computed explicitly: if γg/γh → 1,
then
P
(
g(F ) > VaR1−γg(g(F )) | h(F ) > VaR1−γh(h(F ))
)
∼ P (h(F ) > VaR1−γh(h(F )) | g(F ) > VaR1−γg(g(F )))
and if γ = γg = γh, then we recognize
lim
γ→0
P (g(F ) > VaR1−γ(g(F )) | h(F ) > VaR1−γ) (3.10)
as the usual (symmetric) tail dependence coefficient, e.g. defined in [6], p. 343, eq. (9.75). 
Corollary 3.7. Let u ∈ (0,∞) and assume the situation of Proposition 3.2. Recall the constants
from (3.4).
(a) If V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent, we find
E[g(F ) | h(F ) > t] ∼ α
α− 1(C
h
ind)
−1
d∑
j=1
Eg(AK1/αej)hα−1(AK1/αej)t. (3.11)
(b) If V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically fully dependent, we find
E[g(F ) | h(F ) > t] ∼ α
α− 1(C
h
dep)
−1Eg(AK1/α1)hα−1(AK1/α1)t. (3.12)
(c) For g = h we obtain the classical Conditional Tail Expectation (1.1).
Proof. (a) We evaluate the integral in (3.5) as
E
∫
h(x)>1
g(x)µ ◦A−1(dx)
= (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1E
d∑
j=1
∫
h(x)>1,x∈{uAK1/αej :u>0}
g(x)ν∗({sej ∈ Rd : sAK1/αej ∈ dx}),
where the measure ν∗, called the canonical exponent measure, is related to the exponent mea-
sure ν of the vector V = (V1, . . . , Vd) by ν = ν
∗ ◦ K−1/α, see Lemma 2.2 in [15]. For in-
dependent components ν∗ is concentrated on the axes. We take into account that, whenever
x ∈ {uAK1/αej : u > 0}, the equality
ν∗({sej ∈ Rd : sAK1/αej ∈ dx}) = αu−α−1du (3.13)
holds. Integration over the set {u > 1/h(AK1/αej)} yields∫ ∞
1/h(AK1/αej)
αg(AK1/αej)u
−αdu =
α
α− 1g(AK
1/αej)h
α−1(AK1/αej),
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implying∫
h(x)>1
g(x)Eµ ◦A−1(dx) = α
α− 1(
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1
d∑
j=1
E[g(AK1/αej)hα−1(AK1/αej)]. (3.14)
Since µ˜({h(x) > 1}) = ∫h(x)>1 Eµ ◦A−1(dx) = (∑dj=1Kj)−1Chind, we get (3.11).
(b) To show (3.12), recall that in the presence of full dependence the canonical exponent measure
ν∗ for fully dependent components is concentrated on the diagonal {u1 ∈ Rd : u > 0} and
connected to the exponent measure ν of V by ν = ν∗ ◦K−1, see also Lemma 4.2 in [15]. Hence,∫
h(x)>1
g(x)Eµ ◦A−1(dx)
= ‖K1/α1‖−αE
∫
h(x)>1,x∈{uAK1/α1:u>0}
g(x)ν∗({s1 ∈ Rd : sAK1/α1 ∈ dx}).
For x ∈ {uAK1/α1 : u > 0}, we have Eν({sK1/α1 ∈ Rd : sAK1/α1 ∈ dx}) = αu−α−1du, which
yields ∫
h(x)>1
g(x)Eµ ◦A−1(dx) = ‖K1/α1‖−αE
∫ ∞
1/h(AK1/α1)
αu−αg(AK1/α1)du
= ‖K1/α1‖−α α
α− 1Eh
α−1(AK1/α1)g(AK1/α1).
This leads to (3.12).
4 The conditional systemic risk measures
We are now ready to investigate the conditional systemic risk measures from Definition 1.1 of
a financial or insurance market based on the bipartite graph represented by the random matrix
A = (Aij)
q,d
i,j=1 as in (2.2) with q agents and d objects.
First, we assess to which extent the risk of agent i is affected by high market losses. Second,
we evaluate the influence of the individual agent’s risk to the market risk, reflecting the systemic
importance of an individual agent. Third, we consider the influence of the risk of agent k on the
risk of agent i. Throughout this section we assume that the claims V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically
independent.
In this section we return to the multivariate risk measures from Definition 1.1 applied to
aggregation functions; we take again g(F ) as the projection on some component and h(F ) = ‖F‖
as a norm; here we can even allow for ‖ · ‖ to be only a quasi-norm. In particular this norm, or
quasi-norm, does not have to equal the reference norm in the definition of regular variation in
(3.1).
The following result determines the probability of joint large losses for individual institutions
and the financial system in different conditional situations.
Proposition 4.1. Let V1, . . . , Vd be asymptotically independent and u > 0. Assume that the
conditions of Proposition 3.2 are satisfied. Moreover assume that γ → 0 and κ ∈ (0,∞). Then
P (Fi > VaR1−γκ(Fi) | ‖F‖ > VaR1−γ(‖F‖)) →
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
(4.1)
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P (‖F‖ > VaR1−κγ(‖F‖) | Fi > VaR1−γ(Fi)) →
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{
κ
‖Aej‖α
CSind
,
Aαij
Ciind
}
(4.2)
P (Fi > VaR1−γκ(Fi) | Fk > VaR1−γ(Fk)) →
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{
κ
Aαij
Ciind
,
Aαkj
Ckind
}
. (4.3)
Moreover, for the Conditional Tail Expectations, if α > 1 then
ICoTE1−γ(Fi | ‖F‖) ∼ α
α− 1(C
S
ind)
1/α−1
d∑
j=1
KjE[Aij‖Aej‖α−1]γ−1/α. (4.4)
SCoTE1−γ(‖F‖ | Fi) ∼ α
α− 1(C
i
ind)
1/α−1
d∑
j=1
KjE[Aα−1ij ‖Aej‖]γ−1/α. (4.5)
MCoTE1−γ(Fi | Fk) ∼ α
α− 1(C
k
ind)
1/α−1
d∑
j=1
KjE[Aα−1kj Aij ]γ
−1/α. (4.6)
Proof. We show the following, slightly more general result: Let
g, h ∈ {f : Rq+ → R+ ; f(x) = ‖x‖ and fk : Rq+ → R+; fk(x) = xk, k = 1, . . . , q},
then under the assumptions of this proposition,
P (g(F ) > VaR1−γκ(g(F )) | h(F ) > VaR1−γ(h(F )))
→
d∑
j=1
Emin
{hα(AK1/αej)
Chind
,
κgα(AK1/αej)
Cgind
}
, γ → 0. (4.7)
To show this general result we set VaR1−γκ(g(F )) = t and VaR1−γ(h(F )) = ut. Now recall that
by Lemma 2.3
VaR1−γ(Fi) ∼ (Ciind)1/αγ−1/α and VaR1−γ(‖F‖) ∼ (CSind)1/αγ−1/α, γ → 0.
This implies that
u =
VaR1−γ(h(F ))
VaR1−γκ(g(F ))
=
(Chind)
1/αγ−1/α
(Cgind)
1/α(γκ)−1/α
(1 + o(1)), γ → 0
such that
uα =
Chind
Cgind
γκ
γ
(1 + o(1)) =
Chind
Cgind
κ(1 + o(1)), γ → 0.
We conclude that (4.7) holds by Corollary 3.5.
The analogous expressions for the Conditional Tail Expectation follow immediately from
Corollary 3.7.
Remark 4.2. Here is an interpretation of (4.1) from the viewpoint of a regulator. Assume
that the market situation changes from its normal situation such that, for instance, ‖F‖ >
δVaR1−γ(‖F‖) for some δ > 1, then by (3.7) the factor κ in the limit in (4.1) becomes δακ. For
the sake of argument we call the first contribution of the sum on rhe right-hand side of (4.1),
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‖Aej‖α
CSind
the systemic constant and the second contribution, κ
Aαij
Ciind
, the individual contribution.
Consider the situation, where the minimum has been attained by the individual contribution
under previous market conditions. Then the change in the market, which resulted in the change
of κ to δακ for some δ > 1 can result in two situations. In the first one, the minimum is
still assumed by the individual contribution, even though it is increased by the factor δα. If
the systemic change is so substantial that the individual contribution becomes larger than the
systemic constant, then the limit on the right-hand side of (4.1) becomes the systemic constant.
If a regulator implements the strategy that the limiting conditional probability remains
the same under all market conditions, then it would firstly require that under normal market
conditions
Emin
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
= κ
E[Aαij ]
Ciind
.
If the market comes under stress, then the regulator would raise the Value-at-Risk for the
institution as long as the minimum is still taken by the individual contribution. The situation,
however, that the minimum is taken by the systemic constant indicates that the stressed market
condition can no longer be absorbed by an adjustment of the individual capital reserves. Then
political measures have to be taken.
The other limit relations have analogous interpretations. 
For each of the limiting expressions in Proposition 4.1 the limiting behaviour for κ → 0 is
linear, as is made precise in the next proposition.
We assume that there exist constants w,W > 0 such that 0 < w ≤Wij ≤W and that there
exist constants b, B such that 0 < b ≤ ‖Aej‖ ≤ B. For example, if Wij = deg(j)−11(i ∼ j) then
we can take w = 11+d and W = 1. We set
κ0 = κ0(i) =
bα
CSind
Ciind
Wα
, κ1 = κ1(i) =
CSind
Ciind
bα
Wα
, and κ2 = κ2(i, k) =
Ciind
Ckind
wα
Wα
. (4.8)
Moreover, we define
τ(i) =
d∑
j=1
KjE1(i ∼ j)‖Aej‖
α
CSind
and τ(i, k) =
d∑
j=1
KjE1(k ∼ j)
Aαij
Ciind
; (4.9)
and note that τ(i) ≤ 1 and τ(i, k) ≤ 1 through the definitions of CSind and Ciind, respectively. If
i and k do not share an object then τ(i, k) = 0.
Theorem 4.3. Assume that the conditions for Proposition 4.1 hold and that there exist finite
constanst w,W > 0 such that 0 < w ≤ Wij ≤ W and also finite constants b, B such that
0 < b ≤ ‖Aej‖ ≤ B.
(a) For κ ≤ κ0,
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
= κ
d∑
j=1
KjE
{
Aαij
Ciind
}
= κ. (4.10)
13
(b) For κ ≤ κ1(i),
d∑
j=1
KjE
{
min
{
κ
‖Aej‖α
CSind
,
Aαij
Ciind
}
= κτ(i). (4.11)
(c) For κ ≤ κ2(i, k),
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{
κ
Aαij
Ciind
,
Aαkj
Ckind
}
= κτ(i, k). (4.12)
Proof. To show (4.10) we start with (4.1). Consider the expression
min
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
= 1(i ∼ j) min
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Wαij
Ciind
}
.
If i 6∼ j then the minimum is 0, and if i ∼ j then we can choose
κ <
‖Aej‖α
CSind
Ciind
Wαij
. (4.13)
While this expression is random, κ0 is not random, and for κ ≤ κ0, (4.13) is satisfied for any
realisation of the network. Hence
Emin
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
= κE
{
1(i ∼ j)W
α
ij
Ciind
}
.
Summing over j = 1, . . . , d and recalling the definition of Ciind gives (4.10).
For (4.11) we start with (4.7); the argument is similarly straightforward. Consider the ex-
pression
min
{
κ
‖Aej‖α
CSind
,
Aαij
Ciind
}
= 1(i ∼ j) min
{
κ
‖Aej‖α
CSind
,
Wαij
Ciind
}
.
If
κ ≤ W
α
ij
Ciind
CSind
‖Aej‖α ,
then
1(i ∼ j) min
{
κ
‖Aej‖α
CSind
,
Wαij
Ciind
}
= 1(i ∼ j)κ‖Aej‖
α
CSind
.
In particular, this equation holds for κ ≤ κ1 with κ1 given in (4.8). Again summing over all j
gives (4.11).
To show (4.12) we use (4.3) Consider the expression
min
{
κ
Aαij
Ciind
,
Aαkj
Ckind
}
= 1(i ∼ j)1(k ∼ j) min
{
κ
Wαij
Ciind
,
Wαkj
Ckind
}
.
For κ ≤ κ(i, k),
1(i ∼ j)1(k ∼ j) min
{
κ
Wαij
Ciind
,
Wαkj
Ckind
}
= 1(k ∼ j)κW
α
ij
Ciind
= κ1(k ∼ j) A
α
ij
Ciind
for α > 0. Summing over j gives the assertion (4.12).
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Following on from (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12) we can now assess the limiting behaviour of
ICoVaR, SCoVaR and MCoVaR from Definition 1.1, specified for the aggregation function
h(F ) = ‖F‖, where F = (F1, . . . , Fq) is the random exposure vector. For γi, γ ∈ (0, 1) re-
ferring to agent i and the market, respectively, we consider the following conditional systemic
risk measures:
(a) Individual Conditional Value-at-Risk
ICoVaR1−γi,γ(Fi | ‖F‖) := inf{t ≥ 0 : P (Fi > t | ‖F‖ > VaR1−γ(‖F‖)) ≤ γi},
(b) Systemic Conditional Value-at-Risk
SCoVaR1−γ,γi(‖F‖ | Fi) := inf{t ≥ 0 : P (‖F‖ > t | Fi > VaR1−γ(Fi)) ≤ γ},
(c) Mutual Conditional Value-at-Risk
MCoVaR1−γi,γk(Fi | Fk) := inf{t ≥ 0 : P (Fi > t | Fk > VaR1−γk(Fk)) ≤ γi}.
Theorem 4.4. Assume that there exist constants w,W > 0 such that 0 < w ≤ Wij ≤ W and
that there is an upper bound a < ∞ such that ‖Aej‖ ≤ a. Recall the constants from (4.8) and
(4.9)
(a) As γ → 0, for γi ≤ κ0(i),
ICoVaR1−γi,γ(Fi | ‖F‖) ∼ VaR1−γiγ(Fi) ∼ (Ciind)
1
α (γiγ)
− 1
α ; (4.14)
(b) As γi → 0, for γ ≤ κ1(i)τ(i),
SCoVaR1−γ,γi(‖F‖ | Fi) ∼ V aR1− γiγ
τ(i)
(‖F‖) ∼ (CSind)
1
α
{
γiγ
τ(i)
}− 1
α
; (4.15)
(c) If τ(i, k) 6= 0, then as γk → 0, for γi ≤ κ2(i, k)τ(i, k), we have
MCoVaR1−γi,γk(Fi | Fk) ∼ V aR1− γiγk
τ(i,k)
(Fi) ∼ (Ciind)
1
α
{
γiγk
τ(i, k)
}− 1
α
; (4.16)
and if τ(i, k) = 0 then, as γi → 0,
MCoVaR1−γi,γk(Fi | Fk) ∼ V aR1−γi(Fi) ∼ (Ciind)
1
αγ
− 1
α
i .
Proof. First, from (4.1) and (4.10), for κ ≤ κ0 = κ0(i), as γ → 0,
P (Fi > VaR1−γκ(Fi) | ‖F‖ > VaR1−γ(‖F‖)) →
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
= κ.
Hence for γi ≤ κ0, γ → 0,
P (Fi > VaR1−γγi(Fi) | ‖F‖ > VaR1−γ(‖F‖)) ∼ γi.
Thus ICoVaR1−γi,γ(Fi | ‖F‖) ∼ VaR1−γiγ(Fi). The asymptotics for the VaR follow from
Lemma 2.3, yielding (4.14).
For (4.15), (4.7) and (4.11) give that for γ → 0 and κ > κ1 = κ1(i),
P (‖F‖ > VaR1−κγ(‖F‖) | Fi > VaR1−γ(Fi)) →
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{
κ
‖Aej‖α
CSind
,
Aαij
Ciind
}
= κτ(i).
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In particular, a simple rescaling gives
P (‖F‖ > VaR1−κγi(‖F‖) | Fi > VaR1−γi(Fi)) → κτ(i), γi → 0.
Letting γ = κτ(i) gives that for γ ≤ κ1τ(i)
P
(
‖F‖ > VaR1− γiγ
τ(i)
(‖F‖) | Fi > VaR1−γi(Fi)
)
→ γ, γi → 0.
Now (4.15) follows as before. For (4.16), (4.3) and (4.12) give that for γ → 0 and κ ≤ κ2(i, k),
P (Fi > VaR1−γκ(Fi) | Fk > VaR1−γ(Fk)) →
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{
κ
Aαij
Ciind
,
Aαkj
Ckind
}
= κτ(i, k).
Changing variables gives that
P (Fi > VaR1−γkκ(Fi) | Fk > VaR1−γk(Fk)) → κτ(i, k), γk → 0.
Setting γ = κτ(i, k) and requiring that γ ≤ κ2(i, k)τ(i, k) gives (4.16) when τ(i, k) 6= 0.
The last assertion follows from the fact that Fi and Fk are independent if they do not share
an object.
Remark 4.5. The asymptotic behaviour of the risk measures is assessed in Theorem 4.4 through
the exceedance probabilities conditioned on an extreme event. For example, in (4.16), agent k
has already incurred a very large loss. This loss will have an effect on the loss of agent i if they
share some objects in their portfolios. The more objects they share, the larger τ(i, k) would be.
The unconditional VaR threshold 1−γi at which P (Fi > t) = γi has to be adjusted to 1−γ γkτ(i,k)
if τ(i, k) 6= 0. The larger τ(i, k), the larger 1−γ γkτ(i,k) , hence the more stringent the requirements
on agent i.
The effect of the network on the agent in (4.15) indicates the dependence on τ(i), which
increases with the number of connections of agent i. Again, the larger τ(i), the more stringent
the requirements on agent i should be.
Even in (4.14) there is dependence of the network structure, which is reflected in κ0(i) as
well as in Ciind. 
5 Approximation and illustration of network effects
Throughout this section we restrict ourselves to the situation that the losses V1, . . . , Vd are
asymptotically independent.
5.1 Losses which are not covered
In the bipartite graph model, depending on the random mechanism of the agents to choose
various objects, it can happen that certain objects are not chosen by any of the agents. In the
(re)insurance context of Example 2.1 this means that certain large losses may be not insured.
This happens for instance for certain natural catastrophes like earthquakes, where the state or
the international community may be liable, see [17, 19] for further information and concrete
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numbers. In this subsection we approximate the probability of large losses not covered and we
define
N =
d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) = 0)
as the (random) number of non-covered losses.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that the asymptotically independent objects V1, . . . , Vd have Pareto
tails given in (2.1). Then
P
( d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) = 0)Vj > t
)
∼ t−α
d∑
l=1
Kl P(deg(l) = 0).
Proof. We condition on all possible sets W of non-covered losses and calculate
P
( d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) = 0)Vj > t
)
=
d∑
w=1
P(N = w)P
( d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) = 0)Vj > t | N = w
)
=
d∑
w=1
P(N = w)
∑
W:|W|=w
P
(∑
l∈W
Vl > t
)
P(deg(j) = 0, j ∈ W | N = w)
∼ t−α
d∑
w=1
P (N = w)
∑
W:|W|=w
∑
l∈W
KlP(deg(j) = 0, j ∈ W | N = w)
as t→∞, using that for the asymptotically independent regime (cf. Lemma 2.3 of [15],
P
(∑
l∈W
Vl > t
)
∼ t−α
∑
l∈W
Kl, t→∞.
Hence, interchanging the order of summation and using the law of total probability,
P
( d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) = 0)Vj > t
)
∼ t−α
d∑
w=1
P(N = w)
d∑
l=1
Kl
∑
W:|W|=w
1(l ∈ W)P(deg(j) = 0, j ∈ W | N = w)
= t−α
d∑
l=1
Kl P(deg(l) = 0).
Example 5.2. Assume that, given the number of non-insured losses is N = w for 0 ≤ w ≤ d, all
sets of these w claims have the same probability to be not covered. Then Proposition 5.1 takes on
a particularly simple form. In this setting, P(deg(l) = 0 | N = w) = w/d for every l ∈ {1, . . . , d},
and
P(deg(l) = 0) =
d∑
w=1
P(N = w)P (deg(l) = 0 | N = w) = 1
d
d∑
w=1
wP (N = w) =
1
d
EN.
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Hence
P
( d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) = 0)Vj > t
)
∼ t−αEN 1
d
d∑
l=1
Kl.
Moreover, if all edges are independent and have same probability p ∈ [0, 1] to be present, then
EN =
∑d
w=1 P(deg(l) = 0) = d(1− p)q. In this case, the probability of large non-insured losses
can be approximated by
P
( d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) = 0)Vj > t
)
∼ t−α(1− p)q
d∑
l=1
Kl, t→∞.

5.2 Independent bipartite graph model: conditional systemic risk measures
In this section we exemplify our results based on a bipartite network model, where all edges are
independent and the weighted adjacency matrix A is as in Example 2.1, referring to the situation
of a large claims insurance market. Hence, Aij =
1(i∼j)
deg(j) , where {1(i ∼ j), 1 ≤ i ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤ q}
are independent Bernoulli random variables with E1(i ∼ j) = pij .
5.2.1 Poisson approximations
If d and q are large, we can provide Poisson approximations for the quantities CSind, C
i
ind,
EAij‖Aej‖α−1, EAα−1ij ‖Aej‖, and EAα−1kj Aij which appear in Proposition 4.1. We define by
X ∼ Pois(λ) a Poisson-distributed random variable X with mean λ > 0. We shall use the
following Poisson variables;
Xi,kj ∼ Pois(λi,kj ) with λi,kj =
q∑
l=1,l 6=i,k
pli,
Xij ∼ Pois(λij) with λij =
q∑
l=1,l 6=i
pli, and
Xj ∼ Pois(λj) with λj =
q∑
k=1
pkj .
Proposition 4.1 from [15] gives that∣∣EAαij − pijE(1 +Xij)−α∣∣ ≤ pij min{1, (λij)−1} ∑
k=1,...,q;k 6=i
p2kj =: B(i, j), (5.1)
and, for the r-norm for some r ≥ 1,∣∣∣E‖Aej‖α − E[1{Xj ≥ 1}(1 +Xj)α(1/r−1)]∣∣∣ ≤ min{1, (λj)−1} q∑
k=1
p2kj =: B(j). (5.2)
We shall also employ
B(i, j, k) := min{1, (λi,kj )−1}
∑
`=1,...,q;`6=i
p2`j . (5.3)
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of (2.6), (5.1) and (5.2).
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Lemma 5.3. With the notation as above∣∣∣Ciind − d∑
j=1
KjpijE(1 +Xij)−α
∣∣∣ ≤ d∑
j=1
KjB(i, j). (5.4)
∣∣∣CSind − d∑
j=1
KjE
[
1{Xj ≥ 1}(1 +Xj)−α
r−1
r
]∣∣∣ ≤ d∑
j=1
KjB(j). (5.5)
Similarly as in Lemma 5.3 we can derive Poisson approximations for the limiting quantities
from Proposition 4.1, as follows.
Proposition 5.4. Assume that Aij =
1(i∼j)
deg(j) , where {1(i ∼ j), 1 ≤ i ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤ q} are
independent Bernoulli random variables with E1(i ∼ j) = pij. Define
M1 = min
{
κ
Ciind
,
1
CSind
}
, M2 = min
{
1
Ciind
,
κ
CSind
}
, and M3 = min
{
κ
Ciind
,
1
Ckind
}
. (5.6)
Then for r ≥ 1, for the limiting expressions of the Conditional Value-at-Risk measures,
∣∣∣Emin{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
− pi,jEmin
{(1 +Xij)−α+αr
CSind
, κ
(1 +Xij)
−α
Ciind
}∣∣∣ ≤ M1B(i, j), (5.7)∣∣∣Emin{κ‖Aej‖α
CSind
,
Aαij
Ciind
}
− pi,jEmin
{
κ
(1 +Xij)
−α+α
r
CSind
,
(1 +Xij)
−α
Ciind
}∣∣∣ ≤ M2B(i, j), (5.8)
and for i 6= k,∣∣∣Emin{κ Aαij
Ciind
,
Aαkj
Ckind
}
− pijpkjM3E
[
(2 +Xi,kj )
−α]∣∣∣ ≤ pijpkjM3B(i, j, k), (5.9)
with B(i, j) given in (5.1), B(j) given in (5.2), and B(i, j, k) given in (5.3).
Moreover, for the limiting expressions of the Conditional Tail Expectations, if α > 1, then∣∣∣EAij‖Aej‖α−1 − pijE[(1 +Xij)−α(r−1)+1r ]∣∣∣ ≤ B(i, j), (5.10)∣∣∣EAα−1ij ‖Aej‖ − pijE[(1 +Xij) 1r−α]∣∣∣ ≤ B(i, j), (5.11)
and for i 6= k,∣∣∣EAα−1kj Aij − pijpkjE[(2 +Xi,kj )α]∣∣∣ ≤ pijpkj min{1, (λi,kj )−1} ∑
`=1,...,q;`6=i
p2`j . (5.12)
Proof. We compute for the constants in the conditional probabilities
‖Aej‖α =
( q∑
k=1
1(k ∼ j)
deg(j)r
)α
r
=
( 1
deg(j)r−1
)α
r
1(deg(j) > 0). (5.13)
With (5.13),
min
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
= 1(i ∼ j) min
{
deg(j)−α+
α
r
CSind
, κ
deg(j)−α
Ciind
}
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= 1(i ∼ j) min
{
(1 +
∑
k 6=i 1(k ∼ j))−α+
α
r
CSind
, κ
(1 +
∑
k 6=i 1(k ∼ j))−α
Ciind
}
and consequently
Emin
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
= pijEmin
{
(1 +
∑
k 6=i 1(k ∼ j))−α+
α
r
CSind
, κ
(1 +
∑
k 6=i 1(k ∼ j))−α
Ciind
}
.
(5.14)
Now consider the function k(x) = min
{ (1+x)−α+αr
CSind
, κ (1+x)
−α
Ciind
}
. If CSind ≥ 1 or κCiind ≥ 1 then
k(x) ∈ [0, 1]. In general, 0 ≤ k(x) ≤ min{ 1
CSind
, κ
Ciind
}
= M1 with M1 as in (5.6). Hence
t(x) = M1
−1k(x) = max
(
CSind,
Ciind
κ
)
k(x) ∈ [0, 1].
Now we use a result from the Stein-Chen method to assess the distance to a Poisson distribution
in total variation distance, Eq. (1.23), p. 8, from [3]. This result states that, if W is the sum of
n independent Bernoulli random variables with success probabilities pi and EW = λ =
∑n
i=1 pi
and Z ∼ Pois(λ), then
sup
h:Z+→[0,1]
|Ek(W )− Ek(Z)| ≤ min(1, λ−1)
n∑
i=1
p2i . (5.15)
Applying (5.15) to the function t(x) and keeping (5.14) in mind yields (5.7). The bound (5.8)
follows similarly. Finally,
min
{
κ
Aαij
Ciind
,
Aαkj
Ckind
}
= min
κ
1(i∼j)
deg(j)α
Ciind
,
1(k∼j)
deg(j)α
Ckind

= M31(i ∼ j)1(k ∼ j)
(
2 +
∑
`6=i,k
1(` ∼ j)
)−α
.
As the positive function k(x) = (2 + x)−α is bounded by 1 and as
∑
`=1,...,q;`6=i,k 1(` ∼ j) is a
sum of independent Bernoulli variables, (5.15) can be applied, and (5.9) follows.
For the Conditional Tail Expectations, with (5.13),
Aij‖Aej‖α−1 =
( 1
deg(j)r−1
)α−1
r 1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
=
(1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
)α(r−1)+1
r
= A
α(r−1)+1
r
ij .
Hence (5.1) applies, and yields (5.10). Similarly, with (5.13),
Aα−1ij ‖Aej‖ =
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)α−1
( 1
deg(j)r−1
) 1
r
= A
α− 1
r
ij .
Again (5.1) applies, and yields (5.11).
For the last part we mimick the proof of Proposition 4.1 in [15]. By the independence of the
edges,
E
[
[Aα−1kj Aij
]
= E
[
1(i ∼ j)1(k ∼ j) 1
deg(j)α
]
= pijpkjE
[(
2 +
∑
`=1,...,q;`6=i,k
1(` ∼ j)
)−α]
.
Again (5.15) can be applied and the bound (5.12) follows.
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Remark 5.5. Using (5.4) and (5.5) the constants M1,M2, and M3, as well as the expressions on
the left-hand side of Proposition 5.4, could be bounded further if desired, by a straightforward
but tedious calculation. 
Remark 5.6. Proposition 5.4 gives an exact bound on the distance to Poisson; no asymptotic
regime is suggested. Hence it can be interpreted in different asymptotic regimes.
If the number d of objects increases, while the number q of agents is such that q = o(d
1
2 ),
and the number of objects which an agent would connect to, stays constant in expectation, in a
fashion so that pij ∼ cd for a fixed c, thenB(j) and B(i, j, k) are of order qd−2, B(i, j) is of order
qd−3; as long as q = o(d
1
2 ) the Poisson approximation will be suitable.
Similarly if the number q of agents increases and the number D of objects only increases as
o(q
1
2 ) and if pij ∼ cq for a fixed c, the Poisson approximation would be suitable. 
5.2.2 Homogeneous independent bipartite graph model: Illustrations
To depict our results we consider the most basic case of the bipartite graph that the edges are
not only independent but also equally likely; denote the edge probability with p ∈ [0, 1]. We
also call the edge probability the connectivity parameter, as it is directly proportional to the
density of the network. In this network model all agents behave exchangeably. For this model
the market ranges from a market with no activity at all (p = 0) to a complete graph (p = 1).
Note that non-conditional risk measures on this type of network have already been studied
in [15]. Here, we are interested in the asymptotic expressions given in Proposition 4.1 as well
as in Theorem 4.4 concerning the degree of tail dependence, conditional tail expectations and
conditional Value-at-Risk, seen as a function of the edge probability p, and as a function of κ
where applicable. In all cases, for simplicity of exposition, we concentrate on the interaction of
an agent given the systemic stress and vice versa. We use the following abbreviations for the
right-hand asymptotic expressions of the conditional systemic risk measures in (4.5) and (4.4),
respectively: (AS corresponds to an agent’s risk to exceed its threshold given that the system
exceeds its threshold, and SA to the system’s risk to exceed its threshold given that a specific
agent exceeds its threshold):
CASind = C
AS
ind(i) =
α
α− 1(C
S
ind)
1/α−1
d∑
j=1
KjE[Aij‖Aej‖α−1]γ−1/α,
CSAind = C
SA
ind(i) =
α
α− 1(C
i
ind)
1/α−1
d∑
j=1
KjE[Aα−1ij ‖Aej‖]γ−1/α.
Plots which depend on p start at p = 0.01.
In Figure 2, both quantities are plotted as functions of the edge probability p exemplarily
for different (quasi-)norms while fixing the tail index α = 5. The left-hand plot shows the curves
of CASind. As the parameter p increases, the connectivity in the network increases, having two
effects: Firstly, more object are insured, hence, the agents take a greater risk load. Secondly, risk
sharing among agents who jointly insure an object increases. We can then clearly recognise that
the norms with r > 1 favour diversification leading to a non-monotone behaviour of the curve as
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Figure 2: The risk constants CASind (left) and C
SA
ind (right) for α = 5 (right) as a function of p for different
norms and quasi-norms. The plots start with p = 0.01. Left: for r > 1 the curve is non-monotone. while
for r ≤ 1 it is monotone increasing. Right: the curves are non-monotone for all values of r considered.
the result of the two compelling characteristics of a greater risk load and positive diversification
effects, whereas in the quasi-norm case, diversification is punished and strengthens the effect
of a greater risk load. The right-hand plot shows the curve of CSAind. Since we consider market
losses aggregated by some (quasi-)norm, the losses even for the complete market depend on the
norm parameter r, which is one major difference to the left-hand plot. We also recognise the
appearance of non-monotone curves even for quasi-norms and the sum norm. In the quasi-norm
case there is a (relatively high) value of p at which the risk constant CSA has a local minimum.
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Figure 3: The tail dependence coefficient from (4.1) with κ = 1. Left: fixed sum-norm (r = 1) and different
tail indices α; for small α, the tail dependence coefficient is almost linear, while for larger values of α, the
curves are non-monotone. Right: tail index α = 5 fixed and different (quasi-)norms. The tail dependence
coefficient is almost constant before increasing steeply. In both plots peaks only appear for the sum-norm
and the quasi-norms.
Figure 3 illustrates the symmetric tail dependence coefficient, which is (4.1) for κ = 1;i.e.,
P (Fi > VaR1−γ(Fi) | ‖F‖ > VaR1−γ(‖F‖))→
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
,
Aαij
Ciind
}
as a function of the edge probability p. In the left-hand plot, which concentrates on the very
natural sum-norm (r = 1) and different tail indices α, we observe that for small α, the tail
dependence coefficient is almost linear in the network connectivity parameter p, but for larger
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values of α, the behaviour becomes non-monotone and there exists a locally optimal connectivity
parameter p. As effects of the minimum function, we see small peaks on the curves. In the right-
hand plot, fixing α = 5, the tail dependence coefficient is almost constant before increasing
steeply when the network is nearly a complete graph. Furthermore, peaks, which occur through
the minimum function, only appear for the sum-norm and the quasi-norms here.
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Figure 4: Asymmetric probablities of tail dependence from Proposition 4.1 for different values of κ, with
α = 5 and taking the sum norm. Left: agent given system. As p → 0, all curves converge to the same
value 0.2. As p→ 1, for κ ≥ 1 the curves merge into one single curve, and for κ < 1 the curves converge
to κ. Right: system given agent. For small p the curves are well separated. For p→ 1 the curves tend to
min(1, κ).
Allowing for asymmetry of the tail dependence coefficient in Proposition 4.1 through the
value κ potentially differing from 0, we illustrate the results versions associated with agent
behaviour conditional on system distress and vice versa; i.e., the right-hand sides in (4.1) (agent
given system) and (4.7) (system given agent), which read as
P (Fi > VaR1−γκ(Fi) | ‖F‖ > VaR1−γ(‖F‖)) →
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{‖Aej‖α
CSind
, κ
Aαij
Ciind
}
, γ → 0,
P (‖F‖ > VaR1−κγ(‖F‖) | Fi > VaR1−γ(Fi)) →
d∑
j=1
KjEmin
{
κ
‖Aej‖α
CSind
,
Aαij
Ciind
}
, γ → 0.
Figure 4 shows both quantities as functions of the edge probability p, exemplarily for the tail
index α = 5 and the sum norm. In the left-hand plot—agent given system—all curves apparently
converge to the same point as p → 0 which in our case is close to 0.2. Hence, the influence of
κ diminishes as the network gets less connected. As we move to the complete network; i.e. for
p → 1, for all κ ≥ 1, the curves converge to one single curve, which is clear from the formulas,
and in the case of κ < 1, the curves converge to κ, which can be recognized as the work of the
minimum function. Contrary to the left-hand plot, in the right-hand plot—system given agent—
the values for less connected networks; i.e., small values of p, lie far apart from each other. This
observation can be explained as follows: for small p it would not be unusual to see some Aij = 0,
and it would not be very surprising to see the empty network, with A = 0. The probability that
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the norm of F is positive is larger than the corresponding probability of a single explosure Fi,
hence, κ is multiplied by the factor which has the greater probability to be non-zero. In both
pictures, the curves for κ 6= 1 are dilated to the left and to the right for κ > 1 and κ < 1,
respectively, compared to the symmetric case κ = 1; the directions of dilation are different in
the left and the right plot.
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Figure 5: Asymmetric probablities of tail dependence from Proposition 4.1 for different values of the edge
probability p. Left: agent given system. The curves are piecewise linear and converge to a value close to
p as κ→∞. Right: system given agent. The curves are horizontal at level 1 for κ sufficiently large.
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Figure 6: Asymmetric probablities of tail dependence from Proposition 4.1 for different values of the edge
probability p. The plot starts with κ = 0.001 and κ = 0.0001, respectively. Left: agent given system. For
κ sufficiently small all curves turn to a slope of 1. Right: system given agent. All slopes are different and
close to the respective p.
Figure 5 studies the same quantities but now as a function of κ, with some exemplary
values for p. The resulting curves are piecewise linear as a result from taking the expectation.
For deterministic matrices one would see only one line with particular slope before turning
horizontal. For the risk of agent conditioned on system the curves are finally constant at level p,
while for risk of system given agent the curves are horizontal at level 1 for κ sufficiently large.
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Figure 6 depicts the behaviour of theses curves for κ near to zero, which is connected to
the asymptotics of the conditional Value-at-Risk in Proposition 4.4 through Theorem 4.3. The
left-hand plot in Figure 6 shows that for κ sufficiently small all curves turn to a slope of 1. This
fact is reflected in the asymptotics of ICoVaR1−γ,γi(Fi | ‖F‖) by the absence of an additional
factor. In contrast in the right-hand plot we observe different slopes, close to p in each case.
These different slopes enter the formula for the SCoVaR1−γi,γ as the τ(i) from (4.9); in the
homogeneous model τ(i) = p.
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